CHAPTER 4 - WWII JAPANESE AIR SERVICE - SECTION 3




TABLE OF CONTENTS

  • 5. TRAINING
  • a. General
  • b. Administration
  • c. Pilot Training
  • c.1 Preflight
  • c.2 Primary and Basic Training
  • c.3 Advanced Training
  • c.4 Operational Training
  • d. Ground Training
  •      
  • SECTION III. JAPANESE AIR TACTICS
  • 1. Bombing Tactics
  • 2. Dive Bombing
  • 3. Glide Bombing
  • 4. Torpedo Bombing
  • 5. Fighter Tactics
  • 6. Japanese Fighter Tactics Against B-29's
  • 7. Japanese Night Fighters
  • 8. Air Attacks on Airfields
  • 9. Air-to-Air Bombing



  • 5. TRAINING

    a. General. Evidence available at present does not permit a complete and definite description of the Army Air Force training establishment. Accordingly , the material set forth in the following paragraphs gives the broad outlines and not the specific details of army air training.

    b. Administration

    c. Pilot Training (See Fig 67)
    1. Preflight.
      Two organizations designed to provide pre-flight instruction for potential non-commossioned pilots have been identified; Koku Kyoiku Tai (Air Training Units) and Shonen Hiko Hei Gakko (Air Preparatory Schools). The air training units, although primarily concerned with the preparation of maintenance personnel, nevertheless give pre-flight training to volunteers from among the enlisted personnel of the army. It is believed that the course in these units lasts about two years. The Shonen Hiko Hei Gakko train civilian volunteers between the ages of 14 and 16 for a period from 2 1/2 to 3 years.



    2. Primary and basic training.
      (a) Graduates of the two pre-flight organizations proceed to the Elementary Air Schools ( Hiko Gakko ) for primary and basic training. Here they are given a 6-month general course without regard to type of plane; students complete about 90 hours of duo and solo flying time in advanced trainers.
      (b) In addition to the elementary air schools, which apparently are concerned with the promary and basic training of non-commissioned pilots, there is the Koku Shikan Gakko (Air Academy) which performs the same function for potential officer pilots. Candidates for this school must be over 16 and under 28 years old. There are two categories of tyrainees: "Student" and "cadets"

      "Students" are second lieutenants of other branches (except military police) who have enrolled for flight training.

      "Cadets" are graduates of the Military Academy Preparatory School, for whom the instruction in the Air Academy replaces that given in the Military Academy.

      The course for "Students" lasts approximately 1 year; That for cadets lasts 2 years and 8 months, most of which is thought to be spent in general military subjects. "Cadets" receive commissions upon completing their course of instruction.



    3. Advanced Training.
      (a) Graduates of the elementary air schools, and presumably of the air academy, receive 4 months of advanced training at the advanced air schools. During the 4 month period , fighter and reconnaissence pilots receive about 120 hours of flying time. including aerobatics, combat tactics, and formation and night flying. Bomber pilots receive about 200 hours of flying time.
      (b) After the begining of the war the piolot training program was expanded, and Kyoiku Hiko Rentai (Air Training Regiments) were formed to care for the overflow from the advanced air schools. These units carried on the same type of training as that given at the advanced air schools; but they were located throughout the empire and Japanese-occupied territory while the advanced air schools are located in Japan and Manchuria. Early in 1944 the Kyoiku Hiko Rentai apparently were renamed Kyoiku Hikotai (Air Training Units).

    4. Operational training. Presumably the operational phase of training is conducted within tactical units, its duration being dependant on the proficiency of the pilot. Early in 1944 , However, Rensei Hikotai (Advanced Air Training Units) were created, and although little is known of their functions, literal translation of the name is "training completion" or "fulfillment". It is possible, therefore, that these units were formed to give transitional and operational training in first-line aircraft.



    d. Ground Training.
    1. Koku Kyoiku Tai (Air Training Units). Although Koku Kyoiku Tai do give pre-flight training , they are primarily concerned with the training of maintenance personnel.

    2. Koku Kichi Settei Renshubu (Airbase Construction Training Department) The Koku Kichi Settei Renshubu trains personnel for duty with Yasen Hikojo Settei Tai (Field Airfield Construction Training Department). It was formed in early 1944, replacing the Hikojo Settei Renshubu (Airfield Construction Training Department).

    3. KOKU Gijitsu Gakko (Air Technical school). The KOKU Gijitsu Gakko is primarily concerned with the training of officers in maintenance and the selection and use os supplies. Graduates are assigned to organizations performing theird and fourth echelon manitenance and as technical inspectors.

    4. Koku Tsushin Gakko (Air Signal School). The Koku Tsushin Gakko offers courses in communications and direction finding.

    5. Koku Seibi Gakko (Air Maintenance Schools). The Koku Seibi Gakko provide training in the maintenance of aircraft and aircraft ordnance.





    SECTION III - JAPANESE AIR TACTICS

    1. BOMBING TACTICS

      a. Formations. Japanese bombing tactics examplify certain of their natural traits; courage, indifference to losses, and adherence to preconceived plans. Bombers usually have flown in multiples of 9 in a V of V's, although occassionally attacks have been made in line abreast, with fighters weaving about in loose escort formations. The formations encountered until the close of 1943 were; 6 separate flat V's occassionally with one or two vacancies often with 1 plane at the rear of the apex of the V; a V of three 9 plane V's, with the leading V 50 or 100 feet above the others, changing to a slightly staggered formation of 1 V when 7 or 10 miles from the bomb release point; 3 flights of 9 bombers, succesively stepped up 250 feet from port to starboard, and in line with fighters weaving about the formation; Two 9-plane V of V's with the leading echelon highest and the left echelon next highest.

      b. Characteristics. Attacks were characterized by a long approach in close formation, held persistently regardless of antiaircraft fire and/or fighter opposition. Bomns usually were dropped on a signal from the leader at altitudes from 5,000 to 20,000 feet depending upon the nature of the target and the opposition. Generally, the formation was well maintained until bombs were dropped when it was loosened up somewhat. The flights then engaged in a series of surges up and down, gaining and losing about 500 feet in altitude.

      c. Reconnaissance. The Japanese usually preceded long distance bombing missions by ample air reconnaisance. Scouting aircraft communicate with the home base by radio before the main bombing force leaves its base, alternative objectives are designated. Airfields and shipping in support of landing operations are given high target priority.



      d, Evasion. Evasive tactics against antiaircraft fire are taken by maintaining altitude over the effective range of such fire, by occassional changes in altitude, and by weaving in formation.

      e. Escort. Fighetr escort on bombing missions vary in accordance to the opposition expected and the number of fighters available. The position and escort techniques of fighters protecting bomber formations constantly change. Frequently bombers are escorted by fighters above and behind the bomber formation.

      f. Follow-up. Bomber operations against important targets have been characterized by repeated attacks and "follow up" missions. Many of these attacks appear to have been made along the route and at the same time every day, although not necessarily by the same type of formation.

      g. Tactical Changes.

      (1) By the close of 1943 the Japanese finding themselves on the defensive in many theaters, were oblidge to change their bombing tactics. Their air strength was conserved during an extended period (10 months) of retreat from the outposts of the early Pacific conquests. This resulted in:

      (a) temporary abandonment of daylight horzontal bombing attacks on allied bases or convoy with cover.

      (b) Adoption of dawn and dusk bombing by fighters, and night bombing by medium, torpedo and dive bombers.

      (c) Improved efficiency and coordination in night torpedo and bombing attacks against allied shipping in route and at anchor in advanced bases.

      (2) Vigorous and continuous large scale daylight bombing with fighter escort were renewed by the Japanese during Allied amphibious operations in the Philippines.





    2. DIVE BOMBING

      a. General. Japanese dive bombing attacks, most frequent and effective in the early months of the war and directed largely against shipping and equipment on beachheads. The accuracy of Japanese dive bombing is not outstanding and has been affected by Allied antiaircraft fire and fighter interception. Numerous reports make it clear that Japanese dive and torpedo bombers sometimes attempted to crash on high priority targets such as allied carriers.

      b. Formations.

      (1) The usual Japanese dive-bombing formations are in multiples of 3 as follows:
      3-plane V's in line astern;
      in 6 or 9-plane V's;
      in V's of V's.
      The number of dive bombers employed varies with the nature of the target; for example larger formations are employed against naval vessels than against merchant ships. Efforts are made to saturate enemy defenses by increasing the density of attacking planes. Of late, because of Allied fighter opposition, the approach to the target has been generally at altitudes of from 10,000 to 15,000 feet. Immediately before their initial dive, which approximately one of from 35 degrees to almost vertical (more dives approximate 45 degrees), the Japanese change their formation to one of loose ehelomn or string. Upon this change over, the individual dibes commence in rapid succession, usually from up-sun, from area of restricted visibility, or from coordinates exposing them to minimum antiaircraft fire. The bomb release point varies from 500 feet to as high as 3,000 feet.
      This release point, it is believed, be governed by the pullout point of the lead plane or the intensity of antiaircraft fire. it also has been noted that the bomb release point is usually higher during dives approaching the vertical where greater speeds have been attained.

      (2) When larger formations have been employed, Japanese dive bombers frequently divide their strength into smaller forces and attack a given target simultaneously from different directions.



    3. GLIDE BOMBING

      a. While occassional reports of dive-bombing attacks at angles of 70 degrees to 80 degrees have been received, the majority of attacks have been made by a power glide at an angle of 45 degrees to 50 degrees.

      b. Bombers begin to glide at an height of 3,000 to 5,000 feet and follow each other down until near the target before releasing their bombs. Subsequently, the planes employ their machine guns against ground installations. Retirements are effected at high speed, with evasive action usually limited to short climbs and dips. Attacks are well coordinated and usually are made out of the sun.



    4. TORPEDO BOMBING

      a. Daylight. Daylight torpedo bombing approaches are usually made in close formation at medium altitude. Attacks may be made in a wedge or loose diamond formation, or in small groups which separate to attack individual objectives from different directions. Glides are made at an angle of 40 to 45 degrees, and torpedoes are dropped from an altitude of 200 to 300 feet at a range of 500 to 1,200 yards from the target.

      Approaches are planed from the direction where the least concentration of antiaircraft fire is expected. Full advantage is taken from the position of the sun and cloud formations.

      b. Night. Night torpedo attacks (including dawn and dusk) were greatly developed by the Japanese in 1943 and follow a nearly uniform pattern. Recnnaissance planes drop variously colored flares to reveal the course of the convoy and to identify targets by types. Torpedo planes then attack singly, with the bulk of the force coming from one direction. While few attempt to approach from another course. The attackers skim the surface of the water; drop their torpedos at less than 1,000 yards; perform S curve, dips, and rise for evasion on the way out.

    5. FIGHTER TACTICS

      a. General. Japan fighter tactics against Allied fighters and bombers necessarily vary both while the number and type of aircraft encountered, the conditions under which attacks are executed, and the skill and ability of the Japanese pilots.

      b. Formations.

      (1) The Japanese fighter tactical unit is normally a squadron of nine planes, subdivided into three flights in either V or echelon formation. Formerly a V of three fighter aircraft was employed, flanked by echelons of two fighters. Fighter formations usually fly at an altitude of 15,000 to 20,000 feet.

      (2) The last month of 1943 showed a trend of Japanese adoption of the standard United States Air Force basic fighter formations, consisting of two plane sections and four plane flights. Considerable coordination between planes and sections is evident, with sections fighting in pairs and alternating in attack.

      c. Characteristics of fighter tactics.

      (1) The Japanese fighter pilots usually work with, and believe in , high cover. Their flights usually take off about 1/2 hour apart, so that when one flight has exhausted its fuel a second flight can take over.

      (2) Individual Japanese pilots seldom engage Allied formations or even single aircraft; usually they require nunerical superiority before they will attack.

      d. Deception. Deceptive tactics of various kinds have been extensively employed by Japanese fighters in efforts to lure Allied aircraft out of formations. Fake "dogfights" have been staged, and decoy tactics have been employed with one plane at low altitude protected by others flying as high cover.

      e. avoidance of head-on attacks. Head-on attacks against Allied fighters were generally avoided until after increased armor was installed in the Japanese fighters. Frequently attacks against Allied fighters have been made from above and the side, and if possible, out of the sun. Evasive tactics were characterized by abrupt and violent skids, turns and rolls.

      Japanese fighter pilots attempted to draw their opponents into a steep climd and into stalling position, after which they would do a quick wing over or loop back into their opponents tail. Since late 1943, the favorite evasive maneuver of Japanese fighters has been the split "S". This is a downward half-roll followed by a pullout to normal flight, thus obtaining a 180 degree change in direction with lose of altitude.



      f. Attack on bombers. According to reports, Japanese fighter attacks agains Allied heavy bombers came from all directions. They have attacked allied bombers from 10 to 2 o'clock and at both 9 and 3 o'clock positions. Frequently these attacks have been coordinated by two fighters on each side; One comes in above the wing and one passes below, each peeling off to rake the fuselage of allied aircraft.

      g. Characteristics of attacks on bombers.

      (1) In many cases attacks are not coordinated, and at other times a high degree of coordination has been attained. Reports from the Southwest Pacific area indicate a trend towards greater coordination in frontal and waist attacks.

      (2) The Japanese rely to a great extent on the maneuverability of their planes, and while their tendency towards aerobatics has diminished steadily, the variety of the types of attacks has increased commesuarately.

      (3) Japanese fighters are particularly observant of any damage inflicted on Allied bombers and are quick to take all possible advantage of it. Stragglers are a favorite target of concentrated attacks, and, when a tight formation is maintained by Allied bombers, attacks are usually concentrated on the leader. However, Japanese fighter pilots are not consistent in the degree to which their attacks are pressed home.




    6. JAPANESE FIGHTER TACTICS AGAINST B-29'S

      a. Japanese fighter tactics against B29's have changed considerably since the early missions in June and July 1944. At first they were somehow baffled by the speed and firepower of the B-29's which made interception techniques used against other Allied bombers obslete. This inability to pursue the B-28 was first revealed by the Japanese employment of "hit and wait" tactics which called for concentrated attacks on successive waves of B-29's as they passed over a specific area.

      b. After considerable experimentation the Japanese command apparently has decided that high frontal approaches pressed to close range are most effective.

      c. Air-to-Air bombing attacks have been made against B-29's on occassion but the altitude and speed of these AAF bombers make such bombing attacks quite difficult to accomplish.

      d. A few ineffective airborne rockets have been launched against B-29's.

    7. JAPANESE NIGHT FIGHTERS

      a. During 1943, Allied heavy bombers, operating at night over enemy bases in New Britain and upper Solomons, encountered increased fighter opposition as the Japanese concentrated greater efforts on night interceptions in order to oppose these bombardment missions. Generally, Japanese night fighters have been sighted at 10,000 feet or above.

      b. In 1944 Japanese night figthers were encounteres in all Pacific and Asiatic theaters. This interception was particularly strong against B-29 missions over Japan. Japanese fighters located Allied bombers with teh assistance of crude radar and bombing equipment which is improving in quality and quantity. They also have cooperated with searchlights and antiaircraft batteries in locating Allied bombers.

      When possible, they have also executed normal night fighter attacks on the rear of allied bombers, but effective tean and frontal attacks also have been reported. Some coordinated low frontal attacks have been observed. Night attacks have been pressed to close ranges, with breakaways being being both high and low by means of dives, rolls, and turns. On some occasions Japanese night fighters have launched rockets at AAF bombers. Allied bombers returning to base have been attacked by Japanese night fighter "intruders".

      c. In 1944, the Japanese employed night fighter as escorts for night bombing missions with one fighter flying as wing plane to each bomber.



    8. AIR ATTACKS ON AIRFIELDS

      a. An analysis of Japanese attacks on Allied airfields show distinct changes in the methods employed. It is believd that these changes do not result from the development of improved tactics but were forced on the enemy by the increased strength of Allied air interception and ground defenses.

      b. During the early period of Japanese occupation and expansion, full advantage was taken of the weakness of Allied air and ground defenses. Japanese carrier-borne aircraft operated in conjunction with land based medium bombers. Dive bombers attacked antiaircraft positions and ground installations, with fighters strafing ground airctraft from low level.

      c. Later, as ground and fighter defenses became more formidable, the Japanese were forced to conduct their bombing operations from high altitude. By 1943 their characteristic attack was by night, with a sinle aircraft or small to medium formations of medium bombers. These have been occassions when the Japanese have reverted to daylight attacks, as in their attacks of Allied aircraft based on forward air strips in support of Allied ground forces in New Guinea and the Philippines.

    9. AIR-TO-AIR BOMBING
      a. The Japanese began air-to-air bombing of Allied bombers in May 1942 when a formation of Flying Fortresses was attacked over the Solomons area. The attack was a variation of a technique which had been employed by both British and German fighters and even at that early date abanodoned as inefective. In early attacks the Japanese while in flight dropped long delay (8- to 10 - Seconds) fuzed bombs from 3,000 feet or more above the Allied bombers. The attacks were directed against Allied lead flights and were designed to break open the formation. Other Japanese fighters then attacked momentary stragglers with machine guns and cannon.

      b. Air-to-air bombing was continued for more than a year with very little return for great effort expended. Various droppings and combined attack techniques were tested, and eventually new short delay (3-Second) phosphorus and HE bombs were perfected. Wing racks were installed which allowed fighter planes to carry a total of ten 66-pound bombs. By late 1944, these attacks had become a serious nuisance and potential threat to the success of Allied bombing missions. Air-to-Air bombs in great profusion are now combined with skilfully coordinated machine gun and cannon attacks.

      c. High level bombing.
      When this method was used in 1942-43, the bomb was dropped by the Japanese plane flying at 3,000 feet above the Allied formation. The bomb release point was some distance in front of the formation if the attack was head on. In case the Japanese plane was flying the same heading, the bomb release point was almost direclty above the flying formation. Single and twin-engine planes have used this technique to pattern bomb Allied formations.



      d. Air-to-Air Bombing Attack Tactics.
      When the Japanese developed the 3 second delay fuze, they also developed new tactics for air-to-air bombing. The primary purpose of this bomb was to cause confusion in the Allied bomber formation just prior to the fighter attacks. Single fighters have been known to attack withi this bomb. However, four or more fighters have been used more frequently. When this method was used by four or more fighters, they came in line abreast at 12 o'clock, 300 to 350 feet above the formation. The bomb release point was reached about 3,200 feet in front of the formation at which time all bombs were released. These four bomb-carrying fighters have operated as part of organized attack units.

      e. Air-to-Air bombing attack units.
      Organized attack units for air-to-air bombing are known as KO and OTSU fighter units and have been composed of 16 planes each. The KO units have been composed of 4 bomb-carrying fighters while the remaining 12 fighters acted as cover. Of the 16 fighters in the OTSU units 8 planes attacked the Allied bomber formation while the remaining 8 attacked the Allied escort fighters. After the bombs were dropped and confusion created within the bomber formation, all planes engaged in conventional fighter attacks on the Allied formation.