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| SECTION I | ---------------------------------- | GENERAL |
| SECTION I | ---------------------------------- | AVOIDING AND REDUCING VULNERABILITY TO AMBUSH |
207. Purpose and Scope.
a. This chapter provides the small unit leader guidance in developing and employing counter ambush tactics and techniques.
b. Discussion is limited to tactics and techniques which will assist dismounted units in avoiding, reducing vulnerability to, and countering ambushes. Much of the material, however, is also applicable to mounted units. Material is presented as infantry company, platoon, squad, and patrol actions. Appropriately modified for size, organization, and equipment, it can be applied to any type unit.
c. The tactics and techniques described are guides and are not inflexible. Each situation in combat must be resolved by intelligent application of principles and skillful employment of techniques.
208. Defense Against Ambush.
a. The very nature of ambush, " ... a surprise attack from a concealed position," places an ambushed unit at a disadvantage. Obviously, the best defense is to avoid being ambushed. This is not always possible, however. The unforeseeable circumstances of a combat situation may prevent a unit from taking all the measures necessary to avoid ambush. A unit must, therefore, take all possible measures to reduce its vulnerability to ambush-to reduce the damage it will sustain if ambushed. These are passive measures and must be supplemented by active measures to be taken to destroy or escape from an ambush.
b. A skillfully established and properly executed ambush is extremely difficult to escape from or to eliminate. For these reasons, this chapter emphasizes the measures to be taken to avoid or reduce vulnerability to ambush. c. No single defensive measure, or combination of measures, will prevent or effectively counter all ambushes in all situations. The effectiveness of counter ambush measures is directly related to the state of training of the troops and the leadership ability of the leaders.
SECTION II. AVOIDING AND REDUCING VULNERABILITY TO AMBUSH.
209. General.
a. In avoiding ambush, dismounted units have an advantage over mounted units. They are less bound to roads, trails, and (as in armored units) the more obvious routes of movement.
b. This advantage is lost, however, when:
(1) Terrain, such as heavy jungle, restricts or prohibits cross-country movement.
(2) The necessity for speed requires movement on roads, trails, or waterways.
210. Scope.
This section discusses procedures to assist a dismounted unit to avoid ambush, reduce likelihood of being ambushed, and reduce damage sustained if ambushed.
211. Preparing for Movement.
a. Map Reconnaissance.
The leader makes a thorough map reconnaissance of the terrain over which he will move his unit. He first checks the map's marginal data to determine reliability at the time the map was made. If reliability is not good, or if the map is old, he evaluates its reliability in light of all other information he can obtain. For example, the map is 20 years old; several nearby roads and trails do not show on it; there has been extensive building and development in the area in recent years.
In this situation, the leader can expect to encounter more roads, trails, and buildings that are not shown on the map. He considers the terrain in relation to all available information of known or suspected enemy positions and previous ambush sites. His map reconnaissance includes evaluation of the terrain from the enemy's viewpoint. How could the enemy use this terrain? Where could the enemy position troops, installations, and ambushes?
b. Aerial Reconnaissance.
If possible, the leader makes an aerial reconnaissance. This enables him to compare the map and the terrain. He also obtains current and more complete information of roads, trails, and manmade objects, type and density of vegetation, and seasonal condition of streams.
(1) Additional information. Aerial reconnaissance also reveals:
(a) Movement, or lack of movement, in an area . (friendly, enemy, civilian).
(b) Indications of enemy activity. For example:
1. Smoke. Smoke may indicate locations of campsites, patrols, or patrol bases.
2. Soil. Freshly dug soil may indicate positions or ambush sites.
3. Shadows. Shadows may aid in identifying objects.
4. Unusual objects. Unusual shapes, sizes, shadows, shades, or colors may indicate faulty camouflage.
(2) Limitations. Despite its many advantages, aerial reconnaissance has limitations.
(a) Strength of bridges cannot be determined.
(b) Terrain surface may be misinterpreted.
(c) Mines and booby traps cannot be seen.
(d) Presence of aircraft may warn enemy.
c. Route Selection.
The factors the leader considers are the same whether he is selecting his route or studying a route he has been directed to follow.
(1) Cover and concealment.
Cover and concealment are desirable, but a route with these features may present obstacles to movement. The desirability of these features must be weighed against the requirements for speed of movement. Terrain which provides a moving unit cover and concealment also provides the enemy increased opportunities for ambush. Identification of areas where ambushes may be concealed allows the leader to develop plans for clearing these areas.
(2) Observation and fields of fire.
Selection of, and movement over, a route is influenced by the effects the terrain will have on observation and fields of fire. The leader must consider the observation and fields of fire available to his unit and to the enemy. This affects formations, rates movement, and methods of control.
(3) Key terrain.
Key terrain includes earth features that have a controlling effect on the surrounding terrain. Key terrain must be identified and actions planned accordingly. If, for example, a hill provides observation and fields of fire on any part of a route, the leader must plan £or neutralizing enemy, if any, that occupy the hill.
(4) Obstacles.
Obstacles must be considered. They may impede movement along a route or limit maneuver. Obstacles which will limit enemy action are a desirable feature.
d. Current Intelligence. All available information is considered. Included are known, suspected, and previous ambush sitPs. Other necessary intelligence includes:
(1) Weather and light data.
(2) Reports of units or patrols that have recently operated in the area.
(3) Size, location, activity, and capabilities of guerrilla forces in the area.
(4) Attitude of the civilian population; the extent to which they can be expected to cooperate or interfere.
e. Counter intelligence.
In counter guerrilla operations, in particular, a key feature of preparation for movement is denying the enemy information. A unit is especially vulnerable to ambush if the enemy knows that it is to move, where it is going, its departure time, the route it will follow, and its weapons and equipment. The efforts made to deny or delay enemy acquisition of this information comprise the counterintelligence plan. As a minimum, the plan includes:
(1) Restricted dissemination of information.
All information pertaining to a mission is disseminated on a strict need-to-know basis. This is especially important when the possibility exists that native personnel operating with the unit may be planted informers. Once critical information is given, personnel are isolated so that nothing can be passed out.
(2) If it is likely that the enemy, or enemy informers, will observe the departure of a unit, deception plans may be used. Two examples are shown in figure 96.
f. Communications.
The leader plans the methods by which he will communicate with elements of his unit, with artillery, air, or other supporting units, and with higher headquarters. On an extended move, it may be necessary to establish a radio relay and/or erect a field expedient antenna. An aircraft might be used to communicate with air or artillery support.
g. Fire Support.
Artillery and mortar fires are planned so that, as appropriate, they will deceive, harass, or destroy the enemy. They may be planned as scheduled or on call fires.
(1) Fires are planned as follows:
(a) On key terrain features along the route. These can serve as navigation aids or to deceive, harass, or destroy enemy on them.
(b) On known enemy positions.
(c) On known or suspected ambush sites.
(d) On the flanks of identified danger areas.
(e) Wherever a diversion appears desirable. For example, if the unit must pass near an identified enemy position, artillery or mortar fires on the position will distract attention and may permit the unit to pass undetected.
(f) At intervals along the route, every 500 or 1,000 meters, for example. With fires planned in this manner, the unit is never far from a plotted concentration from which a shift can be quickly made.
(2) Coordination with the supporting unit includes:
(a) Route to be followed.
(b) Scheduled and oncall fires.
(c) Call signs and frequencies.
(d) Checkpoints, phase lines, and other control measures.
(e) Times of departure and return.
212. Movement. a. Intelligence. The unit must provide its own intelligence support. Members must be alert to report information and leaders must be able to evaluate the significance of this information in relation to the situation. (1) Some of the more obvious items from which intelligence may be gained are: (a) Signs of passage of groups, such af:i crushed grass, broken branches foot- . ' prmts, cigarette butts, or other discarded trash. These may reveal identity, size1 direction of travel, and time of passage. (b) Workers in fields may indicate absence of the enemy. (c) Apparently normal activities m villages may indicate absence of the enemy. (2) Less obvious are items which are considered negative information. (a) The absence of workers in fields is an indication that the enemy is near. (b) The absence of children in a village is an indication that they have been hidden to protect them from action which may be about to take place. (c) The absence of young men in a village is an indication that the village is controlled by the enemy.
(3) A knowledge of enemy signaling devices is very helpful. Those listed below are some that have been used by communist guerrillas in Vietnam. (a) A farm cart moving at night shows one lantern to indicate that no government troops are on the road or trail behind. Two lanterns means that government troops are close behind. (b) A worker in the fields stops to put on or take off his shirt. Either act can signal the approach of government troops. This is relayed by other informers. ( c) A villager fishing in a rice paddy holds his pole out straight to signPJ all clear; up at an angle to signal that troops are approaching. b. Security. Security is obtained through organization for movement, manner of movement, and by every man ke.;ping alert at all times. (1) Organizatwn for movement.
Figure 96. Examples of deception plans.
(a) A two-man patrol can maintain security by organizing into a security team with sectors of responsibility as shown in figure 97.
(b) A larger unit can use any standard formation (file, column, vee) and establish a reaction force which is sufficiently separated from the main body that jt will not come under the fires of an ambush attacking the main body. Should the main body be ambushed, the reaction force maneuvers to destroy the ambush.
(c) Any unit of squad size or larger, regardless of formation used, must have security forces to the front, flanks, and rear. A rifle company organized in this manner is shown in figure 98.
(2) Manner of movement. A dismounted unit moves by the same methods as a motorized patrol-continuous movement, successive bounds, or alternate bounds (para 183).
213. Counter ambush Immediate Action Drills.
If ambushed, the unit reacts with the appropriate counter ambush immediate action drill.
Figure 96. Continued.
Figure 97. Security in a two man patrol.
Figure 98. Security organization of a rifle company.